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Abstract
Racial disparities in the criminal justice system are well documented. While one
potential contributor to these disparities may be differential offending on the part of racial
groups, another alternative or additional explanation is racial discrimination. Blalock developed
racial threat theory to explain macro-level discrimination. According to this theory various forms
of “threat” posed by minority populations to majority populations leads to more formal social
control or disparate formal social control, such as the formal social control that is imposed by the
criminal justice system. According to Blalock, “economic threat” occurs when the Black
population has large or increasing economic resources that may allow them to compete with the
White population for jobs, wages, and housing. Blalock predicts that this increased economic
threat will lead to increased disparate formal social control. The theorist further predicts that the
relationship will be moderated by the size of the Black population and have a curvilinear shape.
Using data from the US Census, the Census of Jails, and the Uniform Crime Reports for
2,092 counties, the purpose of this study was to identify whether economic racial threat affects
disparate formal social control in the manner predicted by Blalock. Results from OLS regression
model testing for moderation found that percent Black moderated the relationship between
economic threat and disparity but not in the manner predicted by Blalock. Blalock predicted that
the relationship between economic threat and formal social control would be strongest when the
Black population was small and thus weaker when the Black population was large. The current
study found that the larger the Black population, the stronger (not weaker) the relationship
between economic racial threat and disparate formal social control. And, while Blalock predicted
that the relationship would be positive, the current study found a strong negative relationship.

v

Results examining the shape of the relationship between economic threat and racial disparities in
jail incarceration identified an inverted U-shape consistent with the prediction of Blalock. A
discussion of the findings, theoretical implications, and directions for future research are
highlighted.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Racial disparity in the criminal justice system is well documented. Blacks, in particular,
are overrepresented at the various stages of the criminal justice system. They are
overrepresented, for instance, as arrestees (Mitchell & Caudy, 2017; Patten, Bond, Low-Weiner,
Hood, Lu, Tomascak, & Chauhan, 2019), subjects of use of force (Goff, Lloyd, Geller, Raphael,
& Glaser, 2016; Lautenschlager & Omori, 2019), and subjects of stops and searches
(Baumgartner, Epp, & Shoub, 2018; Ross, Fazzalaro, Barone, & Kalinowski, 2017). Disparities
also exist in defense and prosecutorial practice (Kutateladze & Lawson, 2018; Zane, Welsh, &
Mears, 2016) and in judicial decision-making including sentencing (Arnold, Dobbie, & Yang,
2018; Crow & Johnson, 2008; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). With regard to prison populations,
although Blacks constitute just 13 percent of the population in the United States, they account for
more than 33 percent of the 1.2 million people in prison (Kang-Brown, Schattner-Elmaleh, &
Hinds, 2018; Bronson & Carson, 2019)
It is important to discuss the distinctions between racial differences, racial disparities, and
racial discrimination at the hands of the criminal justice system. Specifically, there are stark
differences in the representation of racial groups in the U.S. population. For instance, according
to the 2010 US census, the US population consists of 60% White Non-Hispanics, 19%
Hispanics, 13% Blacks, 6% Asians, and 2% other. These are “racial differences.” In the criminal
justice system, when we find, for instance, that a certain racial group is disproportionately
represented among arrestees relative to their representation in the population, we have “racial
disparities.” ”Racial discrimination” is linked to the explanations for racial disparities. For
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instance, differential offending is a potential contributor to, or explanation for, racial disparities
in the criminal justice system (Hipp, 2011; Loeber, Farrington, Hipwell, Stepp, Pardini, &
Ahonen, 2015; Mears, Cochran, & Lindsey, 2016); another potential contributing factor is bias
and prejudice (Correll, Hudson, Guillermo, & Ma, 2014; Morrow, White, & Fradella, 2017). If
bias and prejudice contribute to disparities in the criminal justice system, this represents “racial
discrimination.
In this vein, one theoretical approach is reflected in the "racial threat" hypothesis first
introduced by Blalock (1967) to explain macro-level discrimination. Racial threat theory predicts
that various forms of “threat” posed by minority populations to majority populations leads to
more formal social control (FSC) and/or disparate formal social control (D/FSC). Thus, for
instance, many studies have examined how large or increasing representations of racial
minorities in populations may produce perceptions of threat on the part of Whites. The racial
threat hypothesis predicts that, because of these perceptions of threat, Whites will increase social
control or increase disparate social control. They can increase social control using various
systems, including importantly, the criminal justice system.
Blalock identified three types of racial threat–symbolic threat, political threat, and
economic threat. Economic threat, which is the subject of this study, occurs when the Black
population has large or increasing economic resources that may allow them to compete with the
White population for jobs, wages, and housing (Dollar, 2014).
Blalock predicted the shapes of the relationships for all three forms of threat. Blalock,
(1967) proposed the relationship between economic threat and social control to be curvilinear
(inverted U shape.) Discrimination is expected to increase as minorities grow in numbers, and
the slope is expected to taper off as the minority population become substantial. As minorities
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begin to obtain jobs in large numbers, they are viewed as threatening to the majorities, and social
control increases. However, as social control starts to increase, other economic exclusionary
methods will be used in society, such as workplace discrimination. These economic exclusionary
methods will gradually replace social control as social mechanism to cope with racial economic
threat. Therefore, according to Blalock, economic threat will have a decelerating impact on
social control as threat increases. Blalock not only predicted a curvilinear relationship, but he
argued that this relationship would be moderated by the size of the minority population. He
predicts that the larger the Black population the weaker will be the relationship between
economic racial threat and disparate formal social control.
Research examining economic threat has produced mixed results. D’Alessio, Eitle, and
Stolzenberg (2005) examining private police found economic inequality resulted in more police,
rather than serious crime. Stults and Baumer (2007) also found a significant relationship between
perceived economic threat and police size. In contrast, Parks, Stults, and Rice (2005) found no
relationship between economic threat (racial inequality) and arrest rates of Blacks and Whites. In
an earlier study, Eitle and colleagues (2002) failed to find a relationship between economic threat
(operationalized as White-to-Black unemployment) and Black-to-White arrest rates.
There are potential explanations for the inconclusive results from studies testing
economic threat theory. This study remedies some of the weaknesses of the current body of
research by using more current data and with a large geographic spread. Further, and
importantly, this study is the first of its kind, to test both the (a) curvilinear relationship, and (b)
moderating aspects of racial economic threat. Economic threat theory needs research that utilizes
more recent data, examines percent Black across multiple states and jurisdictions, and assesses
economic threat between Blacks and White. To fulfill this need, the current study seeks to

3

answer the following question: Does economic racial threat impact disparate formal social
control in the manner predicted by Blalock?
Chapter Two presents the literature as it relates to racial threat theory. Chapter Three
describes the methodology used in this study. Chapter Four presents the results of the study.
Chapter Five provides a conclusion and discussing study limitations, theoretical and policy
implications, and future research.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review
This chapter will describe racial threat theory as developed by Hubert Blalock (1967) and
provide an overview of the empirical support for the theory. Three types of racial threat will be
identified with a particular emphasis on economic threat including Blalock’s curvilinear
prediction, the subject of this thesis. The working hypotheses for this study developed from the
literature below will be introduced.
Racial Threat Theory
As above, racial disparities in the criminal justice system are well documented and
various explanations have been offered. Blalock (1967) developed racial threat theory to explain
discrimination on a macro-level scale. The key proposition of this theory is that various forms of
“threat” posed by minority populations to majority populations lead to more formal social
control (FSC) and/or disparate formal social control (D/FSC). Blalock (1967) hypothesized that
the White majority would be threatened by a large or increasing Black minority population.
Whites would respond with racial discrimination, he predicted, but the type of discriminatory
response could vary depending, for instance, on whether the threat was to their economic wellbeing or political power. Racial threat theory posits three potential threats—symbolic threat,
political threat and economic threat.
Racial threat theory sets forth one explanation for how and why resources are allocated to
law enforcement and other governmental agencies. The racial threat theory contrasts with that of
public choice theory (Greenberg, Kessler, & Loftin, 1985; Chamlin, 1989). Rational public
choice theory maintains that the majority controls how the community resources are allocated to
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governmental agencies (Chamlin, 1990) and does so on the basis of objective threats, such as
crime rates. Thus, for instance, public choice theory maintains that resources allocated to crime
control efforts are directly linked to the threat of crime (Nalla, Lynch, & Leiber, 1997). In
contrast, conflict approaches maintain that the allocation of resources is based on subjective
threats, such as the subjective symbolic, political, or economic threats posed by minority
populations. According to this theory, increases in resources focused on social control are tied to
the efforts of those in power attempting to control the less powerful (Nalla, Lynch, & Leiber,
1997; Turk, 1969).
Racial threat theory lies under the umbrella of the conflict criminology theoretical
perspective, which holds that laws are designed by the powerful to maintain power. Conflict
theory was developed by Karl Marx; he argued that society is in a state of perpetual conflict
because of competition for limited resources. According to conflict theory, social order is
maintained by dominance and force of the powerful, rather than by agreement and conformity.
According to conflict theory, individuals who are affluent or otherwise powerful try to hold on to
their power and wealth by various means designed to repress people who are poor and otherwise
without power. A basic premise of conflict theory is that individuals and groups within society
try to maximize their own wealth and power. Overall conflict theory focuses on the competition
between groups within society—mainly on how social and economic institutions are used as
tools to maintain inequality and dominance for the ruling class.
As illustrated above, conflict theory posits the powerful create laws to maintain their
dominance in society. Racial threat theory maintains that the threat posed by minorities to the
majority leads to discrimination, such as in the form of formal social control and/or disparate
formal social control. Formal social control can take the form of external sanctions based on laws
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that are enforced by authorized agents including employers, military officers, school systems or
teachers, and others. Importantly, formal social control can be imposed through the criminal
justice system. There are several ways that the criminal justice system can produce formal social
control. For example, research has looked at various empirical measures such as increased law
enforcement presence and/or more arrests, prosecutions, and sentences to incarceration.
As described above, formal social control pertains to the volume of control that might be
imposed when the majority population perceives threat. Some theorists and researchers look
instead at the disparity in formal social control. These individuals argue that perceptions of threat
do not increase social control over the broad population, but instead the social control is directed
specifically to the population producing the threat (e.g., racial/ethnic minorities).
Empirical Support for Racial Threat Theory
There has been a considerable amount of research testing racial threat theory. This
research—testing the relationship between minority threat and formal social control—has
typically measured racial threat as “percent Black” or “percent minorities.” Formal social control
has typically been measured in terms of volume of (or disparities in) criminal justice actions or in
terms of punitive attitudes. Previous research has found support for racial threat theory within
both categories, although there have been contrary findings as well, as reported below.
Impact of Racial Threat on Criminal Justice Actions
Research examining the impact of racial threat on the volume (or disparities in) criminal
justice actions has looked at various aspects of the criminal justice system. Much of this
research has focused on outcomes linked to the policing component of the criminal justice
system, although significant research has also tested racial theory with sentencing outcomes.
Research has also tested how racial threat impacts on outcomes outside of, but related to,
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criminal justice including, disciplinary responses in schools (Welch &Payne, 2010; Hughes,
Warren, Stewart, Tomaskovic-Devey, & Mears, 2017).
As above, the bulk of previous literature examining racial threat theory within the realm
of criminal justice has focused on policing outcomes. For example, research has examined the
impact of racial threat on police force size and police expenditures (Jackson & Carroll, 1981;
Liska, Lawrence, & Benson, 1981; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Kent & Jacobs, 2004), stop and frisk
(Levchak, 2017), arrests (Parker, Stults, & Rice, 2005; Ousey & Lee, 2008; Eitle & Monahan,
2009; Stuckey, 2012; Kane, Gustafson, & Bruell, 2013), and use of force (Smith & Holmes,
2003; Hehman, Flake, & Calanchini, 2018). A number of studies have tested racial threat theory
by examining the relationship between the size of the minority population in a jurisdiction and
“police strength,” measured in terms of the number of police personnel. As an example, Kent and
Jacobs (2005) tested this relationship longitudinally (for the years 1980 through 2000) using data
for large U.S. cities. The authors utilized standard measures for concepts; they used percent
African American as their independent variable and the number of sworn police officers per
100,000 population as their dependent variable. They found a relationship between the size of
minority populations and heightened police presence in cities. (See also Kent and Jacobs, 2004.)
Using these longitudinal data, the authors found that the relationship between percentage of
African Americans and the per capita number of police officers has become stronger in the last
two census years. The implication is that the growth in mean department strength in these large
cities since 1980 is due to a greater threat posed by racial minorities.
While the research of Kent and Jacobs (2004, 2005) focused on the strength of police as
an outcome, other scholars have tested racial threat theory focusing on other police outcomes,
such as police stops, arrests, and use of force. For instance, Levchak (2017) examined New
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York’s Police Department usage of stop-and-frisk on 587,479 police stops in 2010. The research
produced multilevel models that showed the percent of Blacks and Latinos in a precinct
increased the volume of stop and frisks in the area. Hence, the amount of crime is not the leading
cause of stop-and-frisk as should be the case, but rather the precinct-level residential racial
composition is the key driver. In all, this study illustrates that the size of a minority population in
an area impacts volume/disparity in stops.
Research examining racial threat in criminal justice practices has also focused on court
outcomes, particularly sentencing decisions—such as sentences to prison, sentence length, and so
forth (Chen, 2014; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004; Heimer, Johnson, Lang, Rengifo, & Stemen, 2012).
Wang and Mears (2010b), for instance, used data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics State
Court Processing Statistics program and other sources to test the direct and interactive effects of
changes in racial and ethnic threat on prison sentences. The authors' results indicate that
increased racial threat (as measured by percent Black) contributes to a greater probability of
receiving a prison sentence. In a later study, Feldmeyer, Warren, Siennick, and Neptune (2015)
studied the effects of racial, ethnic, and immigrant threat on Florida criminal sentencing using
data from the Florida Department of Corrections Guideline database for the years 2000 to 2006
and found similar results. Consistent with racial threat theory, Feldmeyer and colleagues found
that growing Black populations corresponded with Black defendants being more likely to receive
prison sentences.
Also, with a focus on sentencing, Heimer, Johnson, Lang, Rengifo, and Stemen (2012)
analyzed female imprisonment rates in the context of racial threat theory using data from all 50
states for the period 1981 to 2003. This period provides essential data because, during this time,
there was a boom in the prison population in the United States. With states as their unit of
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analysis, Heimer and colleagues assessed the impact of Black representation in the population on
imprisonment rates as their outcome of interest. Consistent with racial threat theory, the authors
confirmed Black female's imprisonment rates increased with the concentration of Blacks in
metropolitan areas.
Some scholars have tested racial threat with outcomes outside of, but relevant to,
involvement with the criminal justice system. School disciplinary practices are widely associated
with pathways to involvement with the criminal justice system, particularly involving the
punishment of Black males. Payne and Welch (2010) explore how the racial composition of
schools impacts on the use of expulsion and suspension. Their results were consistent with racial
threat theory. In a later study, Hughes, Warren, Stewart, Tomaskovic-Devey, and Mears (2017)
studied the impact of school racial composition on out-of-school suspensions of Black students.
This study, too, confirmed that schools with a large or increasing minority population tend to
implement greater punitive responses and are less likely to respond in a restorative manner.
Types of Racial Threat
Blalock identified three types of racial threat–symbolic threat, political threat, and
economic threat. There are two ways you can describe a symbolic threat. In one version,
symbolic threat occurs when Whites, regardless of high class or low class, view non-Whites as
criminals or otherwise as capable of committing “deviant” behavior (Dollar, 2014). In the second
version the threat emanates from the majority group’s concern with cultural differences; in this
case, Blacks are perceived as a threat to the Whites’ way of life. Political threat results when the
majority population perceives the minority population as large enough to impact voting and thus
public policy, which might favor the interests of Blacks over Whites (Eitle, D’Alessio &
Stolzenburg, 2002). An Economic Threat, which is the subject of this study, occurs when the
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Black population has large or increasing economic resources that may allow them to compete
with the White community for jobs, wages, and housing (Dollar, 2014).
Symbolic Threat
The symbolic threat perspective has received a reasonable amount of support (see King &
Wheelock, 2007; Stults & Baumer, 2007; Brown, 2020; Phelps & Pager, 2016; Western, 2006).
Some researchers have conceptualized symbolic threat using the standard measure of population
composition; that is, they have measured threat in terms of the size of the Black or Latinx
population at a single time point or the change of populations over a period of time. Getting
closer to the theoretical conceptualization of symbolic threat, some researchers have found
indirect support for symbolic threat by illustrating that large or increasing populations of
minorities are correlated with racial prejudice, stereotypes and punitive attitudes (King &
Wheelock, 2007; Welch, Payne, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2011; Ousey & Unnever, 2012). For
example, King and Wheelock, (2007) using data from the Annual Mosaic Survey, illustrated that
changes in the racial composition of counties are associated with individual perceptions of
Blacks as criminals. The researchers asked respondents whether “African Americans pose a
greater threat to public order and safety than other groups, a lesser threat or about the same as
other groups?” Their findings reveal the changes in the size of the African American population
were correlated with perceptions of Blacks as criminals.
Political Threat
Blalock, (1967) proposes that, if the majority perceive minorities as a threat to political
power, it will increase social control of the threatening population to maintain their political
dominance. Because political power is directly tied into the ways public resources are allocated,
any threat towards taking away the majority’s position of political power is a threat to the quality
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and volume of benefits they receive in their communities. Blalock predicted the relationship
between political threat and social control would be an accelerating slope (an upward curve).
That is, as the political threat of minorities increases, there should be an accelerated level of
social control.
Research on this form of threat has operationalized the construct of political threat in
various ways. For example, researchers have used the ratio of Black-to-White voting (Eitle,
D’Alessio, & Stolzenburg, 2002; Wang & Mears, 2010a; Jordan & Maroun, 2016; Updegrove,
Cooper, Orrick, & Piquero, 2020), percentage of voters who voted for a Republican presidential
candidate (Keens & Jacobs, 2009), and the extent to which the leadership is Republican (Jacobs
& Carmichael, 2001; Stucky, Heimer, & Lang, 2005).
Political threat has received mixed empirical support. For example, Wang and Mears,
(2010a), measuring political threat as minority-to-White voting ratio, found it to be associated
with more punitive sanctions. The researchers found the threat effect on prison sentences was
more pronounced at higher levels of Black political threat, lending support to Blalock’s (1967)
argument that there should be an accelerating rate effect. Jordan and Maroun, (2016) measured
political threat using Black-to-White voting. The researchers reported that, in areas of increased
Black population and Black political threat, convicted offenders had a greater likelihood of being
sentenced to prison. (See also Britt, 2000; Weidner, Frase, & Schultsz, 2005; in contrast, see
Feldmeyer, Warren, Siennick, & Neptune, 2015.) Keen and Jacobs (2009) measured political
threat as the percent of citizens who voted Republican. The researchers reported a positive
relationship between percent-voting-Republican and the ratio of Black-to-White prison
admissions. Similarly, Jacobs and Carmichael, (2001) examined political threats measured as
“Republican Strength,” operationalized as the presence of a Republic governor and the
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percentage of Republicans in state legislatures. Using data from the 50 states largely taken from
the 1970’s, 80’s, and 90’s census, the results confirmed that Republican strength led to higher
imprisonment rates. Interestingly, further statistical examinations showed the relationship
became stronger after the Republicans stressed law and order. (See also Greensberg & West,
2001; in contrast, see Yates & Fording, 2005.)
Not all of the research, however, has provided support for political threat threat. Eitle,
D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg, (2002) examined relative voting rates and did not find support for
the political threat hypothesis. They examined the ratio of Black-to-White voting in the 1992 and
1994 general elections in South Carolina and found no impact of political threat on the amount of
social control experienced by Blacks. Overall, in counties where the researchers compared Black
and White voter turnout, they found high Black-to-White voter turnout was not linked to Black
arrest rates, even when they controlled for other relevant factors such as violent crime.
Economic Threat
The current study assesses the impact of economic threat on disparate formal social
control. Blalock (1967) hypothesized that, as minorities become more competitive with the
majority population in terms of jobs and other economic resources, social controls imposed on
minorities will increase. These social controls may be those described above, such as through the
imposition of criminal sanctions, or be more directly focused on the economic competition, such
as through discrimination in the workplace or barriers to employment.
Previous research has operationalized economic threat in several different ways.
Economic threat has been measured, for instance, as White-to-Black household mean income.
Researchers have used this measure as both a direct test of economic threat, and indirectly as a
control variable in studies examining racial threat. Other researchers have operationalized this
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construct as income inequality as measured by the Gini index (Jacobs & Kleban, 2003; Jacobs &
Carmichael, 2001; Phelps & Pager, 2016), poverty as measured by the percentage of the
population living in poverty (Beckett & Western, 2001), and unemployment as measured by the
percent of unemployed or unemployment rate (Updegrove Cooper, Orrick, & Piquero, 2020).
Additionally, several studies testing economic threat have used race-specific measures (Parker,
Stults, & Rice, 2005; Leiber, Peck, & Rodriguez, 2016).
Research has found mixed support for economic threat theory, although most studies
provide some support. Stults and Baumer (2007) measured economic threat from Blacks
perceived by Whites using a single item from the General Social Survey (GSS) data of 1990. The
question asked respondents “to estimate the chances that a White person will not get a job or
promotion while an equally or less qualified Black person gets one.” The authors found Whites’
perceived economic threat to be significantly associated with police force size.
D’Alessio, Eitle, and Stolzenberg, (2005) measured economic threat as “economic
inequality” and examined the impact of serious crime, racial threat, and economic inequality on
private police size. The authors found support for the idea that racial threat and economic
inequality are better predictors of private police size than serious crime rates. In an earlier study,
Jacobs and Helms, (1997) studying public police found similar results. (In contrast see
Greenburg, Kessler, & Loftin, 1985.)
Research using race-specific measures has also produced support for the economic threat
hypothesis. Leiber, Peck, and Rodriguez, (2016) measured economic threat as White-to-Black
unemployment ratio and examined its impact on juvenile court outcomes. The authors found that
the economic threat of Blacks explained the volume of intake and adjudicatory court outcomes.
Jackson and Carroll (1981) measured economic threat as Black-to-White median income and
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examined its relationship to police expenditures. The researchers found a negative relationship—
supporting the argument that more resources are spent in areas with larger economic gaps
between races. In other words, the researchers found that the White response to Blacks is
influenced by racial differences in economic status; when economic differentials are especially
large, Whites see Blacks as more threatening.
Research using race-specific measures has also produced results that do not support the
economic threat hypothesis. Parker, Stults, and Rice, (2005) examined economic threat as a
three-ratio measure of racial inequality: ratio of White-to-Black with a bachelor’s degree, ratio of
White-to-Black with a high school diploma, and the ratio of White-to-Black unemployment rate.
The findings indicate racial inequality does not significantly affect either Black or White arrest
rates. In an earlier study, Eitle, D’Alessio, and Stolzenburg, (2002) measured economic threat as
log of the White-to-Black unemployment ratio and failed to find a relationship with Black-toWhite arrest ratio.
Curvilinear Relationship
Blalock predicts various shapes of the relationship between threat and formal social
control for the types of threat. He is less explicit about the shape of the relationship for symbolic
threat than he is for political and economic threat. As previewed above, Blalock predicted the
relationship between political threat and social control as increasing with an accelerating slope
(an upward curve). Social control is expected to be at its lowest in areas with little minority
political threat (Wang & Mears, 2010a), but as the political threat of minorities increases, there
should be an accelerated level of social control. According to Blalock (1967), when the threat
gets higher, Whites increase their discrimination against the threatening group. Horowitz (1985)
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expanded Blalock’s prediction, he posits that, as Blacks reached parity in the population, they
would be able to mobilize resources to thwart the social control being imposed by Whites.
Blalock proposed that relationship between economic threat and social control would be
an inverted “U.” Feldmeyer and Cochran (2018, p. 286) describe and explain the various
components of the “U” shape:
Blalock’s (1967, p.147) economic competition position suggests that ‘economic
discrimination’ toward minority groups increases as their share of the population grows
but that the slope of this effect tapers off at higher levels of percent minority (an inverted
U shape). When their numbers are small, he suggests that minority groups do not truly
compete for economic resources with the majority in any way that would generate threat
or a notable response. In contrast, he argues that competition is at its highest when groups
are relatively equal in size and are equally competitive for jobs and economic
opportunities. Yet Blalock also argues that there is a threshold effect in which further
increases in minority composition carry less additional weight for economic threat. For
example, he suggests that an increase in percentage Black from 10% to 20% generates
greater competition, threat, and discrimination than an increase from 50% to 60% Black,
at which point economic discrimination may be near its peak.

The research examining the shape of the curve associated with economic threat has
produced three sets of results: a) research that found a Blalock’s predicted U-shape curvilinear
relationship b) research that found a bell-curved curvilinear relationship c) research that found
neither.
Some previous research has found that the shape of the relationship between economic
threat and discrimination is an inverted U. As reported above, Stults and Baumer (2007) found
support for the economic threat hypothesis. As part of this research, they tested the shape of the
relationship between Whites’ fear of crime and police force size and found a significant
curvilinear relationship associated with formal social control. The authors findings are consistent
with Blalock’s reasoning that explicit efforts by the majority to maintain economic dominance
are likely to occur as Black population grows in relative size, but become less necessary as
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Blacks begin to make up a substantial portion of the population. D’Alessio, Eitle, and
Stolzenberg’s (2005) study confirmed that private police rates increase as economic inequality
rises; related to the shape of the relationship, they found that the private police rate peaks at
medium levels of economic inequality and then declines thereafter. The authors’ finding supports
Blalock’s prediction that the usage of formal social control tapers off once the Black population
becomes substantial enough to compete economically. Jacobs and Helms (1997), too, found an
inverted U-shaped relationship between economic inequality and public police size. The
researchers found economic inequality led to substantial expansions in the number of police
throughout most of the analysis period. (In contrast, see Greenburg, Kessle, & Loftin, 1985.)
Earlier literature focused largely on police expenditures also found an inverted U-shaped
curvilinear relationship—consistent with Blalock (1967). Jackson and Carroll (1981) examined
the relationship between the percentage of Blacks in a city’s population and police spending.
Their data came from a sample of 90 cities located outside the South. The researchers found a
positive relationship between Percent Black and police spending when Blacks were in the
minority and a negative relationship when they were in the majority. Similarly, Jackson (1986)
study examined if the relationship between the public fiscal commitment to policing and
minority group size is the same in small and large cities. The author observed in large cities
(50,000+ population) percent Black had a significant impact on the number of resources devoted
to policing, and a curvilinear impact on capital policing expenditures, while controlling for other
important factors. That is, the findings suggest once Black’s make-up a substantial percentage of
the population, they utilize their economic and political power to alleviate social control efforts.
(See also Greenberg, Kessler, & Loftin, 1985; Liska, Lawrence, & Benson, 1981; Chamlin,
1989).
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Previous research has produced findings of the shape of the relationship between
economic threat and discrimination as a bell-curved curvilinear relationship. Leiber, Peck, and
Rodriguez, (2016) examining the impact of White-to-Black unemployment ratio on juvenile
court outcomes found a bell-curved curvilinear relationship. The relationship, however, was not
in the form of an inverted U (see also Jacobs & Woods 1999; Olzak, 1992). Therefore, their
study did not produce findings consistent with Blalock’s prediction.
Research also produced findings with no support for either the curvilinear or U shape. As
stated above, Jordan and Maroun (2016) found a relationship between economic threat and
prison length. The authors did not, however, find a curvilinear relationship between economic
threat and prison length. The authors' data only included 40 of the 75 largest counties in the
United States, consequently, they did not include counties with high threat. A possible
explanation for the authors not finding a relationship is the exclusion of counties where the
“threat” reached a high enough level to start tampering off.
Moderating Impact of Population Makeup
Blalock (1967) not only predicted a curvilinear relationship, but he argued that this
relationship would be moderated by percent Black in the population. Examining the relationship
between economic threat and disparate formal social control, discrimination on the part of
Whites is expected to decrease with the size of the minority population. Specifically, Blalock
predicts “a positive relationship with a decreasing slope” (Blalock 1967, p. 148). He explains
(Blalock 1967, p. 148 – 149) as follows:
As the minority percentage increases, the total amount of intergroup competition should
also increase, but in terms of averages the individual minority member should become
less of a competitive threat… Put another way, a given increase in the minority
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percentage should produce a smaller increment in intergroup competition in situations
where there is already a high degree of discrimination, i.e., where the minority percentage
is already high. For example, an increase of 10 per cent (Black) should produce a greater
increase in degree of competition when this involves a change in the percent (Black) from
say, 10 to 20 percent than would be the case with a change from 50 to 60 per cent.
Previous literature has tested a different relationship: whether perceived threat moderates
the relationship between racial/ethnic context and social control outcomes. Although this
literature is limited, it consistently produced evidence that economic threat moderates the effects
of ethnic population change on punitiveness towards minorities. However, to my knowledge, no
other research has tested the moderating impact of the size of the Black population in a
jurisdiction on the relationship between economic racial threat and disparate formal social
control.
Current Study
Racial threat theory highlights structural racism and explains how racial groups with
power (i.e., White Americans) are able to employ forms of disparate formal social control in
response to the threat by other racial groups, such as Black Americans. Studies have tested racial
threat theory based on the various threats—symbolic, political and economic. There is
considerable support for the economic threat hypothesis, the focus of this study, although there
are contrary results as well. Similarly, the results are mixed for the shape of the relationship
between economic threat and formal social control (or disparate formal social control).
This study remedies some of the weaknesses of the current body of research. First of all,
much of the research is dated. For instance, Jacobs and Helms, (1997) use data spanning 1952 to
1991. D’Alessio, Eitle, & Stolzenberg (2005) utilized data from the 1999 Uniform Crime
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Reports and the 2000 decennial Census, Law Enforcement Management and Administrative
Statistics, and National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates. The most recent study
was completed in 2016 and used data from 1998 through 2007 (Leiber, Peck, & Rodriguez,
2016). This study examines the economic threat hypothesis using more current data and with a
large geographic spread. Further, and importantly, this study is the first of its kind, to test both
the (a) curvilinear relationship, and (b) moderating aspects of racial economic threat.
Specifically, the following hypotheses will be examined:
H1: The size of the Black population in a jurisdiction will moderate the relationship
between economic racial threat and jail disparities, such that the larger the Black population the
weaker will be the positive relationship between economic racial threat and disparate formal
social control.
H2: The relationship between economic threat of Blacks (BW income) and racial
disparities in jail incarceration will reflect an inverted U-shape.
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Chapter Three
Methodology
Data from 2,092 counties were used to evaluate whether population composition and
Black economic threat are associated with county incarceration disparities, when other relevant
variables are controlled. As detailed below, the data for the independent variable, the dependent
variable, and control variables come from the U.S. Census, the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR),
and the Census of Jails (COJ).
Sample
The sampling frame for the current study is U.S. counties with values for the necessary
variables. After the completion of the listwise deletion (the exclusion of any record if a single
value is missing), the final sample consists of 2,092 counties within 45 states. Counties were
excluded if they were missing data, such as missing arrest or incarceration data. Regarding the
latter, the jail census information used to create our dependent variable does not include data
from Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode Island, or Vermont, as each of these states uses a
combined jail-prison system.
Measures
Dependent Variable: Jail Confinement Disparities
Data on race-specific jail populations was obtained from the Census of Jails—a data
collection effort by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Racial disparity amongst the jail populations
is used to measure disparate formal social control. The data on the demographics of jail inmates
come from all jail detention facilities holding inmates beyond arraignment, a period normally
exceeding 72 hours. The jail census includes detainees held past arraignment, regardless of
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whether pre-trial or post-conviction, and consequently catches a scope of possibly racially
impacted criminal equity measures, including restrictive bail, conviction, the in/out decision, and
sentence length. The jail data exclude state prisoners.
There are several reasons why using jail data to measure criminal justice disparities is
superior to other measures (such as prison disparities). First of all, using jail data is advantageous
because it allows for the assessment of criminal justice discrimination for lower-level offenses
where officials have the greatest discretion. Research indicates that discrimination is more likely
where discretion is greater (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Hester & Hartman, 2017). Another
reason to use jail data instead of prison data for this study is that, once incarcerated individuals
reach prison, they are frequently housed in prisons out of the original county of residence or
offense, which means county-level social control responses cannot be determined. Finally, jail
data are superior because they are linked to the advantage of using counties as the unit of
analysis instead of states. Jails are operated at the county level; prisons are operated at the state
level. States are more heterogeneous in terms of population makeup; counties are much more
homogenous. It is more appropriate to use counties than states because of the more homogenous
nature of a county compared to a state—avoiding heterogenous bias.
The race-specific confinement rates are created by dividing the quantity of countywide
Black incarcerated individuals by the number of countywide Black residents, and similarly the
number of White incarcerated individuals divided by the number of White residents. This
information is used to create the dependent variable, which reflects the Black-to-White ratio of
confinement rates, log-transformed to account for substantial right-skew.
Previous racial threat theory is unclear on whether the formal social control that is
produced by threat would be focused on the population generally or on the population that is
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producing threat (Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018; Zane, 2018). There is more empirical support for
racial threat theory when the dependent measure is disparate formal social instead of formal
social control (e.g., see Eitle et al., 2002; Mears et al., 2016; Ousey & Lee, 2008; Parker et al.,
2005; Stolzenberg et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2008). As a result, the dependent measure in this
study looks at disparate formal social control and not formal social control imposed on the
general population.
Independent Variable: Black-to-White Median Household Income
The measure of Black economic threat reflects the ratio between Black resident median
income and the White resident median income for each county. The association between the
dependent variable and the log of the economic threat measure was also examined since this
transformation captures more closely the essence of economic competition as articulated
originally by Blalock (1967). If the economic threat hypothesis has any merit, the coefficient for
the ratio of Black-to-White median household income should be positive and statistically
significant.
Moderating Variable: Percent Black
The moderating variable percent Black is measured as the percentage of Blacks in the
county’s population based on the 2010 Census (Eitle, D’Alessio, & Stolzenberg, 2014). Percent
Black also serves as a control for the other types of threat. Previous research has used percent
Black to represent all the different ways racial threat could manifest—including symbolic,
political, and economic threat. In the current study, therefore, because the data do not include
independent measures of symbolic or political threat, Percent Black serves as a proxy measure
(and therefore, controls) for the other forms of threat allowing for the identification of the unique
impact of racial economic threat.
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Control Variables
Gini Index (100)
The Gini Index is a measure of the income inequality in a county. It is measured on a
scale between 0 and 1, where 0 represents perfect equality and 1 represents perfect inequality.
Previous studies have measured economic threat using the Gini Index (Liska & Chamlin, 1984;
Liska, Chamlin & Reed 1985; Chamlin, 1989), but this measure alone fails to account for racial
differences.
Index crime rate
The three measures of crime come from the UCR. The Index crime rate includes eight
crimes that the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) combines together to produce an annual
crime index. The offenses include willful homicide, forcible rape, robbery, burglary, aggravated
assault, larceny over $50, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
Violent crime rate
Violent crimes are defined in the UCR program as those offenses that involve force or
threat of force. Violent crime is composed of four offenses: murder and nonnegligent
manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.
Property crime rate
According to the FBI’s UCR program, property crime includes the offenses of burglary,
larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
South
This variable measures whether a County is located in a southern state or not.
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Analytic Strategy
The analyses used to test Blalock’s economic threat proposition proceeded in four stages.
In the first stage, descriptive statistics were produced to describe the variables and two
histograms were created of Black-to-White ratio confinement rates–one using the raw data and
the other using log-transformed numbers to account for substantial right-skewness.
In the second stage, an OLS regression model was calculated to evaluate whether population
composition and Black economic threat are associated with county incarceration disparities when
other relevant variables are controlled for in the model. In the third stage, the models include an
interaction between percent Black populations and Black economic threat, which tests for
variations in the effect of Black economic threat across different racial compositions. Finally, a
fourth OLS regression model tests for a curvilinear relationship using a quadratic term of Black
economic threat.
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Chapter Four
Results
This chapter discusses the results of the analysis to answer the main research question of
this study. The descriptive statistics are discussed first, followed by the presentations of the
results of the OLS Regression models that test the two hypotheses.
Descriptive Statistics
The basic descriptive level statistics were produced to gain a better understanding of the
analytic sample. Table 1 provides the mean, median, and standard deviation for the independent
variables, control variables, and dependent variable.1

Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Black over White Jail Rate
Ln Black over White Jail Rate
Black over White Median Income
Percent Black (15 to 64)
Gini Index
Property Crime Rate
County is in a Southern state

Obs.
Mean Std. Dev. Min
2,092
7.69
28.52 0.012
2,092
1.42
0.96 -4.462
2,092
0.69
0.34 0.078
2,092
13.14
16.25 0.225
2,092 2527.60 1297.21 0.000
2,092
43.63
3.49 32.600
2,092
0.57
0.49 0.000

Max
1073.6
6.979
3.856
87.015
8450.3
64.500
1.000

On average counties have a Black jail incarceration rate 7.69 times greater than the White
incarceration rates, with a standard deviation of 28.52, and ranging from a low of 0.012 to a high
of 1,073.6. In contrast, the natural logarithm of Black-to-White jail incarceration rate mean is
1.42 and the standard deviation is 0.96. The natural log is a common function used by
researchers to adjust variables that tend to have a substantial skewed distribution. In short, the

1

Black-to-White jail Rate and Black-over-White jail rate are used interchangeably.
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function contracts the original variable making its distribution much more normal by pulling
extreme values closer to the mean. Turning to the key theoretical variables, we see that the
Black-to-White median household income has an average of 0.69, which ranges between a low
of 0.08 and a high of 3.86.
Figure 1 displays a histogram of the Black-over-White Jail Rate in the original scale. The
findings of this figure were a skewed right distribution (also known as a “positively skewed”
distribution).
Figure 1 – Histogram of the Black-over-White Jail Rate in the Original Scale

Figure 2 displays a histogram of the Black-to-White Jail Rate in the logarithmic scale. By
making the distribution normal, the mean, median, and mode are closer to the center of the
histogram. A normally distributed variable is more appropriate for OLS regression models and
for the present analysis for multiple reasons (Alisson, 1999). First, it makes assumptions
underlying OLS regression more tenable for the present models. Second, it ensures that estimates
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are not excessively influenced by extreme counties, and thus are more reflective of an average
association across the analytic sample.
Figure 2 – Histogram of the Black-over-White Jail Rate in the Loggarithimic Scale

Table 2 presents the OLS regression model predicting the (Ln) Black-to-White jail rate.
Model 1 shows that the Black-to-White median household income has a positive bivariate
association with Black-to-White jail rate (β = 0.172, p < 0.01), though the variable is only able to
account for 0.4% of the total variation in the dependent variable (R-squared = 0.004). Model 2
depicts that Percent Black has a negative bivariate association with Black-to-White jail
incarceration rate (β = -0.0182, p < 0.01), and that this variable accounts for 9.5% of the total
variation in the dependent variable (R-squared = 0.095). Model 3 shows that once percent Black
and Black-to-White income ratio are included simultaneously in the model, the association
between BW income and BW jail disappears (β = -0.0300, p > 0.10), though the coefficient for
percent Black remains significant, and with the same magnitude (β = -0.0184, p < 0.01). This
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result suggests that the initial bivariate coefficient of BW Income is possibly attributable to
percent Black, perhaps though a moderation. Model 4 includes the interaction term between
Black-to-White median household income and percent Black. In that model, the main effects of
both variables are small and non-significant, indicating that BW Income has no association with
BW jail rates when the percent of the Black population is very low. However, the negative value
and significant value of the interaction term (β = -0.0382, p < 0.01) indicates that as percent
Black increases, the total effect between BW Income and BW jail rates becomes gradually more
negative. In other words, the higher the percent Black the more negative is the total effect of
Black-to-White median household income. After the inclusion of the control variables in Model
5 the interaction term remains negative and significant (β = -0.0374, p < 0.01), and the main
effect for BW income is still small and non-significant (β = 0.0397, p > 0.10). In contrast, the
percent Black has a positive association with BW jail rate (β = 0.0087, p < 0.10). All the control
variables, namely the Gini index (β = 0.0166, p < 0.05), the property crime rate (β = -5.2-5, p <
0.01), and the indicator for a county in a Southern state (β = -0.300, p < 0.01) have a negative
and significant association with the dependent variable.
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Table 2 – OLS Regression Model on the (Ln) Black-over-White Jail Rate with
Interaction Terms
VARIABLES

Model 1

BW median household
income (BW Income)

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

0.172***

-0.0300

0.0926

0.0397

(0.0614)

(0.0602)

(0.0653)

(0.0648)

-0.0182***

-0.0184***

0.00295

0.00874*

(0.00123)

(0.00127)

(0.00471)

(0.00494)

-0.0382***

-0.0374***

(0.00814)

(0.00840)

Percent Black

Model 2

BW income * Percent
Black

-0.0166**

Gini Index

(0.00666)
-5.15e05***

Property Crime Rate

(1.80e-05)
County is in a Southern
state

-0.300***
(0.0459)

Constant

1.306***

1.664***

1.686***

1.619***

2.585***

(0.0473)

(0.0257)

(0.0521)

(0.0538)

(0.279)

Observations

2,092

2,092

2,092

2,092

2,092

R-squared

0.004

0.095

0.095

0.104

0.133

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses
Figure 3 illustrates the interaction estimated in Model 4 of Table 2. The figure depicts the
predicted values of Black-over-White jail rate by Black-to-White medium household income and
percent Black. Based on the figure, Black-to-White Income Ratio has no association with Blackto-White Jail Rate in counties with a small Black population (2%; approximately the 1st quartile).
However, there is a strong negative association between Black-to-White Income Ratio and
Black-to-White Jail Rate in counties with a high Black population (20%; approximately the 3rd
quartile). The figure shows that the estimated impact of Black-to-White Income Ratio depends
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on the proportion of the population who identifies as Black. In addition, Black-to-White Income
Ratio has a negative effect only where there is a high proportion of Blacks concentrated in a
county. In conclusion, the Black-to-White Jail Rate has the smallest disparity in counties with a
large Black population and a high Black-to-White Income Ratio.

Figure 3 – Predicted Values of Black-over-White Jail Rate by Black-over-White Medium
Household Income and Percent Black
1.7

Predicted BW Jail Rate (Ln)

1.6
1.5
1.4
Small Black Pop (2%)

1.3

Large Black Pop (20%)
1.2
1.1
1
0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

BW Income Ratio

Note: Percent black is held at approximately its first, and third quartiles. All other variables are
held at their means. Predicted values were calculated from Model 5.

Table 3 tests for a curvilinear association between the Black-to-White income ratio and
the Black-to-White jail rate. Model 1 shows that BW Income does not have a linear or quadratic
bivariate association with jail disparities incarceration. Model 2, however, includes an interaction
between the BW Income (linear and quadratic terms), and the Percent Black. Model 3 further
shows that those coefficients and interactions remain virtually unchanged with the inclusion of
the controls for the Gini index, the property crime rate and the indicator for a southern state.
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The significant interaction terms in that model suggest that there is variation in the
association between BW Income across levels as percent Black. However, those interaction
terms are difficult to interpret directly because they are operationalized as a three-way interaction
(between BW Income, BW Income, and Percent Black). In a three-way interaction, the
coefficients’ magnitude and even the significances are difficult to interpret because even the twoway interactions between each of the components are allowed to vary across levels of a third
variable. The present research follows extant research in using a plot with predicted probabilities
to visualize the three-way interaction (Baumer & Gustafson, 2007, Weiss, Testa, & Santos,
2020).
Table 3 – OLS Regression Model on the (Ln) Black-over-White Jail Rate; Quadractic and with
Interaction Terms
VARIABLES
BW median household income (BW Income)
BW income # BW income

Model 1
-0.0639
(0.158)
0.101
(0.0625)

Model 2
-0.268
(0.168)
0.235***
(0.0686)
-0.0456***
(0.01000)
0.119***
(0.0299)
-0.120***
(0.0222)

1.409***
(0.0793)
2,092
0.005

1.746***
(0.0868)
2,092
0.117

Percent Black
BW Income # Percent Black
BW Income # BW Income # Percent Black
Gini Index
Property Crime Rate
County is in a Southern state
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Model 3
-0.312*
(0.166)
0.234***
(0.0675)
-0.0421***
(0.0101)
0.127***
(0.0298)
-0.125***
(0.0220)
-0.0149**
(0.00662)
-6.01e-05***
(1.80e-05)
-0.304***
(0.0456)
2.654***
(0.288)
2,092
0.146

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses
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Again, a plot of predicted probabilities is used to illustrate the interaction results. In
particular, plotted is the influence of Black-to-White income ratio on Black-to-White jail rate at
two distinct levels of Black populations (2% and 20%). As depicted in Figure 4, counties with
small Black populations that have a high Black-to-White income ratio have higher probabilities
of disparate Black-to-White jail rates. The predicted probability of disparate Black-to-White jail
rates is lower in settings where a high population of Blacks and a high Black-to-White income
ratio exists. These results are consistent with Blalock’s (1967) prediction of a U-shaped inverse
relationship.

Figure 4 – Predicted Values of Black over White Jail Rate by Black over White Medium
Household Income and Percent Black – Curvilinear Effects
1.7

Predicted BW Jail Rate (Ln)

1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
Small Black Pop (2%)

1.2

Large Black Pop (20%)
1.1
1
0.9
0.8
0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

BW Income Ratio

Note: Percent Black is held at approximately its first, and third quartiles. All other variables are
held at their means. Predicted values were calculated from Model 5.
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Chapter Five
Discussion and Conclusion
First, this chapter discusses the results in the context of the study’s hypotheses. That
discussion is followed by the articulation of the theoretical and empirical implications and the
implications for policy and practice. Finally, the study limitations are identified, and guidance is
provided for future research.

Overview of the Results
The purpose of this study was to assess whether economic racial threat impacts disparate
formal social control in the manner predicted by Blalock (1967). Blalock predicted that the
relationship between economic threat and disparate formal social control would be moderated by
the proportion of the population that was Black and he predicted a U-shaped relationship. This is
the only study to date to test both the moderating impact of Percent Black and the shape of the
curve. It uses more current data than previous studies and uses data from 2,092 counties from
across the US.
The first hypothesis was that economic threat would be positively related to jail
disparities, and that this relationship would be moderated by the size of the Black population.
The prediction was that the larger the Black population, the weaker would be the relationship
between economic racial threat and disparate formal social control. For economic threat, Blalock
(1967) predicted a positive relationship with decreasing slope. He projected that, as the
percentage of minorities increases, the economic threat to the majority population would
increase, but “in terms of averages the individual minority should become less of a competitive
threat” as the minority population grows (p. 148).
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This study found overall support for racial threat theory and support for percent Black as
a moderating variable. The analysis confirmed a moderating impact of percent Black, but in the
manner quite different from that predicted by Blalock. Blalock predicted that the positive
relationship between economic threat and formal social control would be strongest when the
Black population was small and thus weaker when the Black population was large. The results of
the current study showed that the larger the Black population, the stronger (not weaker) the
relationship between economic racial threat and disparate formal social control. And while
Blalock predicted that the relationship would be positive, the current study found a strong
negative relationship between economic threat and disparity when the percent Black in the
county is high versus low.
The second hypothesis was that the relationship between Black economic threat (Blackto-White income) and racial disparities in jail incarceration would reflect an inverted U-shape.
Blalock (1967) suggested that discrimination toward minority groups increases as their economic
threat grows, but that the slope of this effect tapers off at higher levels of economic threat.
Blalock posited that, once Blacks attain substantial economic power, they are able to use their
resources to combat the discrimination. These three processes would produce the proposed
inverted U-shape, but only a few studies have tested this relationship and found this predicted
shape (Stults and Baumer, 2007; D’Alessio, Eitle, & Stolzenberg, 2005).
The results supported the second hypothesis. This study—examining the relationship
between economic threat (measured as Black-to-White Income) and racial disparities in jail
incarceration—identified an inverted U-shape consistent with the prediction of Blalock. These
results suggest that Blacks are likely to face increasing discriminatory practices as their
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economic threat rises up to the point that their economic power is on par with Whites; once
Blacks achieve higher Black-to-White income, the disparate treatment lessens.
Theoretical and Empirical Implications
This study testing Blalock’s economic threat hypothesis has both theoretical and
empirical implications. The finding of a relationship between Black-to-White medium household
income and racial disparities in local jail incarceration is consistent with the baseline proposition
of racial threat theory, which maintains that the criminal system is a tool used by Whites and
other individuals in power to maintain their dominance in society and control the minority
populations that poses potential threats. The finding of a relationship between economic threat
and disparate formal social control is consistent with other research (Stults & Baumer, 2007;
D’Alessio, Eitle, & Stolzenberg, 2005; Leiber, Peck, & Rodriguez, 2016).
The results provide partial support for the other key propositions of the economic threat
hypothesis of racial threat theory. First of all, the results of this study provided support for the
proposition that the relationship between economic threat and discriminatory formal social
control is curvilinear. According to this proposition, Blacks experience the least amount of
discrimination when they pose the least threat economically, but discrimination increases as their
economic threat grows. Blalock defined economic threat in terms of size of the Black population
and suggested that Blacks can expect bias and discrimination to be at its height when their
population is of relatively equal in size to the majority and thus are able to compete for economic
resources. Racial threat theorists explain the downward-curve findings by suggesting that once
Blacks make up a substantial proportion of the population, they are able to thwart the
discriminatory practices implemented against them. This study, using actual measures of
economic threat (versus Percent Black), produced findings consistent with other research that has
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identified a curvilinear relationship (Stults & Baumer, 2007; D’Alessio, Eitle, & Stolzenberg’s,
2005). As Blacks obtain economic power relative to Whites, disparities in the criminal justice
system were reduced. Indeed “economic threat” as operationalized here (and elsewhere in racial
threat research) is equivalent to “economic power.” So while Blacks may be more threatening,
they are also acquiring more power to thwart the discriminatory tendencies of the majority
population.
Something else may be happening as well that implicates Blalock’s “symbolic threat.”
One version of symbolic threat is that the majority population links the minority population to
criminal threat, and yet we know from extensive criminological research that economic status is
a key predictor of involvement in street crime (Piquero, 2015; Quinney, 1964; Bjerk, 2007). The
increased economic power of the minority population may correspond with their reduced
involvement in street crime, which itself might reduce the overall “threat” experienced by the
majority population. This reduced threat could lead to reductions in discriminatory formal social
control. This possibility supports the suggestion below that future research explore how the
various forms of threat might interact to affect the levels of disparity in the criminal justice
system.
Blalock’s second proposition pertained to the moderating impact of the size of minority
population. The current study provides support for Blalock’s proposition that the relationship
between economic threat and discriminatory formal social control is moderated by the size of the
minority population, but not in the manner predicted by Blalock. There are two aspects of
Blalock’s proposition, and neither was supported. The first component pertained to the context
(as defined by minority representation) in which the relationship between economic threat and
discrimination would be the strongest. Blalock predicted it would be strongest when the minority
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population was small, and that the relationship would weaken as the minority population got
larger. The second aspect of his prediction pertained to the direction of the relationship. He
predicted a positive relationship—meaning the greater the economic threat the greater the
disparate formal social control. Combining the two components, as percent minority increased,
Blalock predicted “a positive relationship but with decreasing slope” (Blalock 1967, p. 148). In
contrast to Blalock’s proposition, this study found that the stronger relationship was when the
minority population was large; further the strong relationship in that large minority population
was negative. As seen in Figure 4 of the results, in counties with small Black populations (2% in
that figure), increased economic threat did not affect discrimination. In contrast, in counties with
large Black populations (20% in that figure), as economic threat increases, disparity rises
somewhat, but then tapers off and discrimination is reduced.
The combined results from testing the two propositions have important theoretical
implications. The results of the curvilinear proposition provided evidence that the increasing
economic power of Blacks thwarts discrimination. According to the test of the second
proposition, however, the increasing economic power of Blacks only thwarts discrimination
when their numbers are large. The implication is that reductions in discrimination do not come
from economic power or large numbers in isolation. Instead, minorities need both economic
power and large numbers to “change the curve” of discrimination.
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Implications for Policy and Practice
The present study is a confirmation that racial threat produces discriminatory behavior
within the criminal justice system. Discriminatory behavior in the criminal justice system—such
as discrimination manifested in the incarceration of Blacks as found here—needs to be reduced.
Discrimination needs to be addressed in every component of the criminal justice system,
including law enforcement, courts and corrections. One intervention receiving increased
attention is implicit bias training of criminal justice officials. Implicit bias training can help
individuals become aware of their bias and explore how their biases can produce discriminatory
behavior, and it can provide individuals with skills for reducing and managing their biases
(Fridell, 2017; Fridell & Brown, 2015). This training may need to go beyond criminal justice
officials. Racial threat theory has various theoretical ambiguities including how and by whom
threat is experienced. Are the criminal justice officials directly experiencing this threat or is the
general public experiencing this threat and putting pressure on the officials to discriminate? If, in
fact, it is the latter, then the implicit bias training and other prejudice/discrimination-reducing
measures need to be implemented more broadly with community members.
The present study may have implications for efforts to promote integration. This study
found a relationship between Black economic threat and discriminatory formal social control and
found a moderating effect of Percent Black, such that the relationship between economic threat
and disparate formal social control is strongest in areas higher populations of Blacks. Two
unacceptable policy implications are that society, to reduce discrimination, should (1) reduce the
economic power of Blacks, and/or (2) reduce the number of Blacks in areas in order to reduce
discrimination. A more acceptable policy direction may pertain to greater integration of Blacks
and Whites. Contact theory, out of psychology, posits intergroup contact under appropriate
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conditions can effectively reduce prejudice between Blacks and Whites, and thus reduce
discrimination (Allport, 1954; Laurence, 2014; Laurence, Schmid, Rae, & Hewstone, 2019).
Consistent with this theory, Black and White families living in the same neighborhood (and
having positive interactions) could reduce bias and thus discrimination. Indeed, practically
speaking, integration efforts are probably best suited at the neighborhood-level, rather than a
county-level (which reflects the unit of analysis for this study). It would be misguided to assume
that moving more Blacks into a county would potentially solve the discrimination problem as the
Blacks and Whites might still be segregated from each other. The integration needs to be at the
neighborhood level to increase the likelihood of regular positive interactions.
Legal interventions should be used to identify criminal justice disparities and implement
policies to end them. One version of this is the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) “Patterns and
Practice” program. Through this program, the DOJ can investigate criminal justice entities (such
as police departments, prisons) to identify constitutional violations, of which discrimination is
one. There are a few suggestions in which direction should be directed to local police
departments. They can and have analyzed data to identify disparities and then, as warranted,
entered into consent decrees with provisions directed toward reductions in discriminatory
criminal justice actions. The Obama administration relied on consent decrees to hold local police
departments accountable. In contrast, during the Trump administration, the DOJ stopped
intervening with local departments. President Biden announced that his administration would
revitalize this DOJ program (Phillips, 2021). The process will be most effective if used to reform
various components of the criminal justice system—not only police departments, which have
received the most attention. The DOJ should hold all components of the criminal justice system
accountable for discriminatory practices.
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Study Limitations and Future Research
While this study makes both theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature by
assessing the relationship between economic racial threat and disparate formal social control,
there are a number of weaknesses of the current study with implications for future research.
As above, a key contribution of this study is the operationalization of the dependent
variable, not just as formal social control, but disparate formal social control. The use of this
operationalization can be classified as a strength or weakness, depending on whether the scholar
views social control as diffuse or targeted. Several scholars have studied the dependent variable
as diffuse—the criminal justice system widening the net for individuals to get incarcerated—
regardless of race or ethnicity. For some researchers and theorists, the social control is presumed
to be targeted enforcement aimed at the minority group. Additional theoretical clarification and
empirical assessments are needed.
This study used disparities in jail confinement as the measure of discriminatory formal
social control. This narrow conceptualization focuses on just one component of the criminal
justice system. Future research should replicate the examination here, but use alternative or
additional dependent variables that reflect other components of the criminal justice system (i.e.,
law enforcement, courts, corrections). This future research might show that the relationships
identified within the current study are replicated when examining other decision points within
the criminal justice system. Alternatively, it is possible that researchers find that the effects of
racial threat impact differently on various criminal justice decision points.
The internal validity of this study could have been enhanced with a stronger measure of
economic strength/threat. The current study used Black-to-White median household income to
produce the measure of economic threat. Median household income is only one measure of
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economic strength and does not fully capture the economic threat that Blacks might pose.
Economic threat might additionally or alternatively take the form of, for instance, net worth, and
home ownership. Individuals may have a low income but have inherited wealth that could
produce threat to the majority population. Future research using enhanced measures of economic
power will strengthen our understanding of how economic threat manifests and produces
disparate formal social control.
Another weakness in the present study is the imprecise measurement of symbolic and
political threat used as controls in an effort to isolate economic threat. Blalock (1967) posited
that the different forms of threat operate in different ways, and even proposed different shapes of
their relationships with formal social control. Consistent with previous research, the current
study used Percent Black as a proxy measure for threat. This study would have been
strengthened by incorporating specific, independent measures for each type of threat. This
recommendation is consistent with the suggestion of Stults and Baumer (2007, p. 520) that
research incorporate more precise operationalizations of the various forms of threat.
More precise measures of symbolic threat should reflect the two ways that symbolic
threat has been conceptualized. One form is when Whites feel their cultural/values are threatened
by Black individuals. Another form is when Whites view Blacks as criminals. The first form
might be measured through survey items tapping into the threat majority populations perceive to
their values and culture. The second form might be measured using data from the Harvard
Implicit Association Test (IAT). The “Weapons IAT” measures the extent to which the
respondents link people of color to threat and aggression. Researchers could potentially use these
data, aggregated to the county level, as a measure of the second form of symbolic threat.
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Researchers have produced various operationalizations of political threat. For instance,
political threat has previously been operationalized as proportions of the population that vote
Republican versus Democratic, based on the history of Democrats helping marginalized groups.
Future research might utilize even more direct measures of political power (and thus “political
threat”) by using the percent or number of officials in the geographic area under study who are
Black. At the county level, this could include mayors, school board member, and district
attorneys. These kinds of measures account for the degree to which members of the Black
community have obtained political leadership positions.
Researchers should adopt quality measures of economic, symbolic, and political threat,
and conduct studies that examine the impact of all three of these measures on formal social
control, building on the single study to date that has included measures of all three threats (Eitle,
D’Alessio, & Stolzenberg, 2002). By including all three forms, researchers could identify the
varying predictive powers of each form of threat, controlling for the others, and explore (1) the
shapes of the relationships for symbolic, political, and economic threat; and (2) the moderating
impact of percent Black—using percent Black, percent Black squared, and percent Black cubed.
This research with all forms of threat included would also allow researchers to see whether and
how the various forms of threat might interact to produce discrimination.
Future research should examine whether the relationship between threat and
discriminatory formal social control varies across types of areas, such as rural versus urban and
regions of the country. This research could examine, for instance, whether the same racial threat
mechanics produce discriminatory formal social control in small rural counties versus large
urban cities. Such research could assess whether and how racial threat produces formal social
control across regions to determine whether and to what extent the theory is region-specific.
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Conclusion
This research found partial support for Blalock’s economic threat hypothesis. Consistent
with his predictions, economic threat produced disparate formal social control, this relationship
reflected a U-shaped curve, and Percent Black moderated the relationship, albeit in a manner
different from that predicted by Blalock. This is the first known study to examine both the
curvilinear relationship and moderating impact of population makeup when examining the
relationship between economic racial threat and disparate formal social control. The present
study adds to the empirical literature on racial threat and adds clarity to a theory for which
theoretical ambiguities have been identified (Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018).
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